

**INTERNAL INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN  
OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO ABDULLAH ALMALKI,  
AHMAD ABOU-ELMAATI AND MUAYYED NUREDDIN  
(THE "INQUIRY")**

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**NOTICE OF APPLICATION**

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**IN THE MATTER OF**  
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**OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO ABDULLAH ALMALKI,**  
**AHMAD ABOU-EL MAATI AND MUAYEED NUREDDIN**  
**(THE “INQUIRY”)**

**NOTICE OF APPLICATION**

ABDULLAH ALMALKI, AHMAD ABOU-ELMAATI and MUAYYED NUREDDIN (“the Applicants”) and AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CANADIAN SECTION (ENGLISH BRANCH), BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES MONITORING GROUP, CANADIAN ARAB FEDERATION, CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS, CANADIAN MUSLIM CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION and HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (“the Intervenors”) will make an application to the Inquiry on Tuesday, October 9, 2007 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon after that time as the application can be heard, at the Bytown Lounge, 111 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario.

PROPOSED METHOD OF HEARING:

The Applicants and the Intervenors ask that this application be heard orally.

THE APPLICATION IS FOR:

1. Disclosure of the names of all Canadian officials interviewed by Inquiry Counsel, save those currently employed by CSIS in covert operations;
2. Production of all documents disclosed to Inquiry Counsel by all of the participants in the Inquiry, without redaction save and except where there are valid national security confidentiality (“NSC”) claims requiring redaction;

3. A Direction that all interviewees with knowledge of the following issues be called as witnesses to give evidence publicly:
  - a. embassy and consular conduct;
  - b. the Canadian government's practice and policy on torture;
  - c. information sharing with foreign regimes; and
  - d. requests by Canadian officials to secure information from Messrs. Almalki, Elmaati and Nureddin while they were in detention; and
4. Such further and other relief as counsel may request.

THE GROUNDS FOR THIS APPLICATION ARE:

1. The Applicants have a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry;
2. The Inquiry was called pursuant to the recommendation of Commissioner O'Connor in the Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar that the cases of the three Applicants be reviewed "through an independent and credible process that is able to address the integrated nature of the underlying investigations and inspires public confidence in the outcome";
3. While the Terms of Reference and the Commissioner's May 31, 2007 ruling both envision the conduct of portions of the Inquiry in public, to date there have been no public hearings, no witnesses called to give evidence publicly, and no disclosure of documents to the public or even to the Applicants themselves;
4. It is essential to ensure the effective conduct of the Inquiry that key witnesses be called to give evidence in public hearings and that documents (redacted only for valid NSC claims and not including those documents previously submitted to the Arar Commission) be disclosed to the public;

5. Rules 2, 6, 8, 11, 12(c), 26, 28, 33 of the General Rules of Procedure and Practice of the Inquiry;
6. Such further and other grounds as counsel may submit and this Inquiry accept.

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE will be used at the hearing of the Application:

1. The Affidavit of Hadayt Nazami, sworn October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2007;
2. Such further and other evidence that counsel may submit.


Dated this 2<sup>nd</sup> day of October, 2007.



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Solicitors for Human Rights Watch

**IN THE MATTER OF**  
**INTERNAL INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS**  
**OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO**  
**ABDULLAH ALMALKI, AHMAD ABOU-ELMAATI**  
**AND MUAYYED NUREDDIN**  
**(THE "INQUIRY")**

**AFFIDAVIT OF HADAYT NAZAMI**  
**(sworn October 2, 2007)**

I, HADAYT NAZAMI, of the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario,  
MAKE OATH AND SAY AS FOLLOWS:

1. I am a Barrister and Solicitor, called to the Ontario Bar in July 2004. I am retained as one of the counsel representing Mr. Elmaati before this Inquiry. I continue to represent Mr. Elmaati. The Legal teams representing Messrs. Mr. Elmaati, Almalki and Nureddin have, in large part, worked in close association and coordination so as to better assist the Inquiry in the conduct of its work. As such, I have knowledge of the matters set out below.

2. On April 2, 2007, Messrs. Elmaati, Almalki and Nureddin were granted standing in this Inquiry as Participants. The Commissioner found that they were persons with substantial and direct interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry.

3. By ruling of the same date, a number of organizations were granted standing in this Inquiry as Intervenors: those who have a genuine concern about the subject matter of the Inquiry and have a particular perspective or expertise that may assist the Commissioner. The organizations joining with the three men in this Application were all granted Intervenor status.

4. The April 2, 2007 ruling provided that both Participants and Intervenors would be entitled to:

- (a) make submissions to the Commission on the Terms of Reference of the Inquiry and the proper process for the Inquiry to follow in light of the Terms of Reference;
- (b) make opening and closing submissions to the Inquiry; and
- (c) submit background documents, including analyses or studies, on issues of relevance to the mandate of the Inquiry.

Importantly, the Commissioner ruled that “further participation and involvement may arise as events unfold.”

5. On April 17, 2007, a hearing was held to receive submissions from Participants and Intervenors on questions related to the Terms of Reference and the procedures to be followed in the conduct of the Inquiry. At that time, counsel for Messrs. Elmaati, Almalki and Nureddin (the “Non-Government Participants”) involved in the within application submitted that, at a minimum, evidence relevant to the following issues must be called in public hearings:

- (a) embassy and consular conduct;
- (b) the Canadian government’s practice and policy on torture;
- (c) information sharing with foreign regimes; and
- (d) requests by Canadian officials to secure information from Messrs. Elmaati, Nureddin and Almalki while they were in detention.

6. On their behalf, counsel further submitted that the Inquiry’s hearings should only be conducted in secret where national security confidentiality claims are

made. Counsel asked that they be security cleared in order that they may be permitted to attend any private hearings.

7. The Intervenors in the within application joined with the Non-Government Participants in those submissions.

8. In his ruling dated May 31, 2007, the Commissioner adopted the government view that the Inquiry's hearings should, in the main, be held *in camera* and that counsel for Messrs. Elmaati, Almalki and Nureddin would not be permitted to attend those *in camera* sessions. Rather, the Commissioner held that we could have input into the Inquiry by consulting with Inquiry counsel prior to the interviews of Canadian officials by Inquiry counsel.

9. The Commissioner did caution, however, that "one should be mindful of the importance of being flexible." He stated that it "may be necessary to modify the approach of the Commission in doing its work" and furthermore, "if there are ways to balance interests in a more transparent way every effort should be made to do so without violating the Terms of Reference or the interests that must be properly acknowledged."

10. Following the ruling of May 31, 2007, counsel for Messrs. Almalki, Elmaati, and Nureddin - Paul Copeland and Jasminka Kalajdzic, Barbara Jackman, John Norris and I - consulted with Inquiry counsel in the manner described in the ruling. We met with Inquiry counsel on less than half a dozen occasions. Significantly, those meetings were "off the record" at the request of Inquiry counsel and subsequently the Commissioner himself. On one occasion, Messrs. Almalki, Elmaati, and Nureddin personally attended a meeting with us and Inquiry counsel to get a status update on the interview process taking place.

11. Inquiry counsel have interviewed a number of Canadian officials over the course of two or three months this summer. I understand that those interviews were conducted *in camera* and were attended by government counsel. Although Inquiry

counsel has disclosed to us a list of some of the Canadian officials interviewed, the list has not been made public. It is also unclear at this time whether we have been given a complete list of everyone who has been interviewed.

12. Messrs. Almalki and Elmaati were granted standing on a limited basis at the Commission of Inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar (the "Arar Commission"). In the Arar Commission, there was a substantial public phase of hearings and it was, of course, publicly known who was testifying during that phase.

13. There has been no public disclosure of the work of the Inquiry since the issuance of the May 31, 2007 ruling. The Non-Government Participants have repeatedly asked for the Inquiry to be more open and transparent in light of their "substantial and direct interest" in the subject matter of the Inquiry and the public interest raised by the issues being considered. While having deep reservations about the secret process taking place, the Non-Government Participants have co-operated to the fullest extent, and in the hope that their requests would be adopted.

14. The Non-Government Participants and Intervenors in this application are extremely worried about the erosion of public confidence in this Inquiry. Since the release of the Commissioner's May 31, 2007 ruling, public attention has heightened on issues like government secrecy, RCMP incompetence, and overclaiming of NSC in government documents. By way of example, I attach as Exhibit "A" to this may affidavit some of the articles published in various Canadian newspapers.

15. Counsel for the Non-Government Participants and the Intervenors have stated their concerns and requests on the record in a number of letters. For example, on June 14, 2007, Mr. Copeland wrote to the Commissioner expressing concern that we were being given virtually no information about the CSIS interviewees and thus would be unable to make meaningful suggestions as to lines of questioning for those unnamed officials. On June 27, 2007, Ms. Kalajdzic wrote to Inquiry counsel expressing concern

about the shortcomings of the process that had evolved since release of the May 31, 2007 ruling and asking for clarification about how the Inquiry was going to proceed.

Specifically, she asked:

- (a) if there would be any interviewees examined in more formal hearings and if counsel for the Non-Government Participants would be permitted to test their evidence;
- (b) if there would be summaries of the evidence obtained via the *in camera* interviews;
- (c) for disclosure of documents or document summaries which are not subject to a valid NSC claim; and
- (d) for expurgated transcripts of the interviews of Canadian officials as it was "impossible" to advance our clients' interests in this Inquiry without, at the very least, being given expurgated transcripts of the interviews and examinations of witnesses.

Attached as Exhibit "B" are copies of these two letters.

16. I am also aware that the Intervenors have had several meetings with Inquiry counsel and in one case, the Commissioner himself. Again, these meetings were "off the record" at the request of Inquiry counsel and the Commissioner. Nevertheless, the Intervenors have, at various times, written to the Commissioner and his counsel, to place formally on the record, concerns and suggestions to improve the Inquiry process. By way of example, I attach as Exhibit "C" letters dated August 22 and September 17, 2007, from Alex Neve, Secretary-General of Amnesty International Canada, on behalf of his organization and a number of other Intervenors.

17. Both the Non-Government Participants and the Intervenors have repeatedly stressed that their ability to engage with and contribute to the Inquiry process

in a meaningful manner is virtually impossible given the secret nature of the process. To date, we have been given:

- (a) no disclosure of any documents filed with this Inquiry;
- (b) no summaries of documents;
- (c) no opportunity to attend any interviews of any Canadian officials;
- (d) no meaningful summaries of the substance of the interviews conducted;
- (e) no list of the documents filed in the Inquiry;
- (f) no opportunity to test any of the government's evidence;
- (g) no dates or information on the nature of hearings or other sessions that might be open to the public;
- (h) no indication that the Commissioner himself will participate in any interviews of Canadian officials; and
- (i) no confirmation that any interviewees will be witnesses in a hearing at which counsel for the Non-Government Participants and/or the Intervenors would be permitted to attend.

18. In substance, although granted standing as Non-Government Participants and Intervenors, we have not truly participated in any meaningful way in this Inquiry.


19. After considerable consultation, the Participants and Intervenors believe that to ensure the "effective conduct of the Inquiry", it is necessary that the following portions of the Inquiry be conducted in public:

- (a) **Disclosure.** Documents filed with the Inquiry that were not previously filed at the Arar Commission should be disclosed and redacted only for valid NSC claims;

- (b) **List of Documents.** A list of all documents received by the Inquiry, including those to which an NSC claim has been made, should be disclosed;
- (c) **List of Canadian Officials Interviewed.** A complete list of all interviewees should be made public. In the case of interviewees currently engaged in covert operational activities for CSIS, particulars of the role they played in the investigations of the Non-Government Participants should also be disclosed;
- (d) **Witnesses.** All officials with information relevant to the following issues should be called as witnesses in public hearings where counsel for the Non-Government Participants will have the opportunity to cross-examine them if necessary:
  - (j) embassy and consular conduct;
  - (ii) Canadian government's practice and policy on torture;
  - (iii) information sharing with foreign regimes;
  - (iv) requests by Canadian officials to secure information from Messrs. Almalki, Elmaati and Nureddin while they were in detention.

20. I make this Affidavit in support of an Application for disclosure and directions on public hearings and for no other or improper purpose.

SWORN BEFORE me at the City  
 of Toronto, in the Province of  
 Ontario, this 2<sup>nd</sup> day of October, 2007.

  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 A Commissioner, etc.

)  
 )  
 )  
 )  
 )  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Hadayt Nazari

This is Exhibit "A" to the  
Affidavit of Hadayat Nazami  
Sworn before me this 2<sup>nd</sup>  
day of Oct. 2007 AD.

Bl. Godwin  
A Commissioner etc.

## Lessons not learned

ADAM RADWANSKI, AUGUST 19, 2007 AT 2:57 PM EDT

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I'm back about a day late to add much of value to the Maher Arar fallout; it's been well-covered by others, including my colleagues on the editorial board. But if we're going to look ahead a little (while still looking back), it's probably about the right time to ask whether we should be asking a bit more of this.

Granted, none of the three gentlemen at the centre of the Iacobucci inquiry cut quite the sympathetic figure that Arar did. They're not as telegenic or articulate, and their innocence might not be quite as clear-cut. But bottom line is, we've got an inquiry into very familiar allegations - that Canadian citizens were imprisoned and tortured in Syria (and Egypt) with some degree of Canadian complicity - and nobody much seems to care.

More to the point, we're not being given much opportunity to care. To their credit, the Conservatives showed they took the allegations of Muayyed Nureddin, Abdullah Almalki and Ahmad El Maati seriously by appointing a retired Supreme Court justice to look into them. But then they instructed said retired Supreme Court justice to keep the inquiry "internal," by which they apparently meant secretive.

Some measure of secrecy is reasonable when national security matters are in play, but Iacobucci seems to be taking it beyond even what the Tories had implied. The inquiry is so clandestine that even Nureddin, Almalki and El Maati aren't getting to find out much about what led to the apparent abuses they endured.

To make matters worse, he seems hell-bent on limiting the number of witnesses appearing before him. In part, it's been suggested to me, that's because he's dead-set against going past the January 2008 deadline the Tories set for his report - giving him very little time to get through three separate cases.

If the inquiry flies under the radar as it proceeds, that might not be the end of the world. But if it produces a half-assed result, we're all going to be the poorer for it. You'd think what we found out this week about the perils of secrecy would have Canadians (not least opposition politicians) crying foul. Instead, we seem to have determined that one Maher Arar is enough for us - a noble sentiment if it means preventing further cases like his, but not if it's ignoring past ones.

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## Leeway for Mr. Iacobucci

The Globe and Mail. Toronto, Ont.: Aug 14, 2007. pg. A.12

### Abstract (Summary)

Last December, in his final recommendations on the [Maher Arar] case, Judge O'Connor suggested further investigation into the treatment of Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou El Maati and Muayyed Nureddin - all three of whom were imprisoned and allegedly tortured in Syria on suspicions of terrorist links. Unlike Mr. Arar, who was detained by U.S. officials in New York and shipped overseas, they were all seized while travelling through the Middle East.

### Full Text (409 words)

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After previously censored details of Mr. Justice Dennis O'Connor's report were made public last week, Canadian officials' role in the injustices done to Maher Arar became clearer than ever. What remains to be seen is whether their complicity in Mr. Arar's imprisonment and torture in Syria was an isolated incident or part of a broader pattern.

A federal inquiry into three outwardly similar cases has the potential to answer that question. But that may require Frank Iacobucci, the former Supreme Court justice leading it, to go beyond what the government envisioned when it appointed him.

Last December, in his final recommendations on the Arar case, Judge O'Connor suggested further investigation into the treatment of Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou El Maati and Muayyed Nureddin - all three of whom were imprisoned and allegedly tortured in Syria on suspicions of terrorist links. Unlike Mr. Arar, who was detained by U.S. officials in New York and shipped overseas, they were all seized while travelling through the Middle East. But Canadian officials may have provided information to Syria that led to their arrests, and in turn may have received information from their interrogations there. Indeed, the previously censored passages of Judge O'Connor's report reveal that the RCMP applied for search warrants on the basis of information the Syrians extracted from Mr. El Maati.

Hoping to avoid the revelation of sensitive information, and possibly also eager to limit embarrassment to the national security establishment, the federal government instructed Mr. Iacobucci to conduct an "internal" investigation almost entirely behind closed doors. And it gave him a deadline of January, 2008 - less than a year to examine the fate of three men, even though it took 1½ years for Judge O'Connor to investigate Mr. Arar's case alone.

Neither the need for secrecy nor the need to adhere to arbitrary time constraints should limit Mr. Iacobucci's ability to get to the bottom of these cases. But lawyers for the three men at the centre of the inquiry, along with civil-liberties advocates, have alleged that this is what is happening - especially since it has not been confirmed whether key witnesses such as former RCMP commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli and other senior Mounties will be heard from.

In light of the latest revelations surrounding Mr. Arar's case, Mr. Iacobucci should be given as much time and leeway as he needs. Finding out the truth about how Canada views our civil liberties cannot take a back seat to expediency.

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### Three men imprisoned in Middle East question secretive process of probe

The three men who were imprisoned in the Middle East in circumstances similar to Maher Arar say they cannot get assurances that key witnesses such as former RCMP commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli will be questioned at an inquiry into their treatment.

Lawyers for the three, who say they were tortured, have gone to the Federal Court of Canada seeking an order to open up the secretive process set by retired Supreme Court judge Frank Iacobucci. They say they are concerned that the inquiry will not be credible.

Although Mr. Justice Dennis O'Connor's inquiry into Mr. Arar's case found last year that Canadian officials fed misleading information to the United States that probably led to his deportation and torture in Syria, it had no mandate to investigate the three other cases.

Mr. Iacobucci was appointed in December to conduct an "internal" inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in the cases of Muayyed Nureddin, Abdullah Almalki and Ahmad Abou El Maati - a probe that is proceeding almost entirely behind closed doors.

Questions have lingered over whether Canadian officials provided information to officials in Syria and received information obtained from their interrogations there.

Yesterday, censored portions of Mr. O'Connor's report, released under a Federal Court order, showed that the RCMP applied for search warrants in 2002 using information that the Syrians obtained by interrogating Mr. El Maati, who was being detained there.

But his lawyers have been unable to obtain assurances that the RCMP officer who applied for the warrants, Sergeant Randy Walsh, will be questioned by the Iacobucci inquiry.

"If Justice Iacobucci wasn't aware of this issue before, then there's problems going on with the Iacobucci inquiry," said Barbara Jackman, a lawyer for Mr. El Maati.

In the first phase of the inquiry, commission lawyers are interviewing officials and others in private, and Mr. Iacobucci may adopt their findings as his own.

Commission counsel John Laskin said in a recent interview that he cannot say whether Mr. Zaccardelli will be questioned.

"That hasn't been finally determined yet, but a number of the others on their proposed list, we are indeed interviewing," Mr. Laskin told *The Globe and Mail*. "I'm not going to say that we're necessarily going to interview everybody they say we should interview, because at the end of the day, it's our judgment."

In correspondence filed with the Federal Court, Jasminka Kalajdzic, a lawyer for Mr. Almalki, asked why lists of interviewees did not include Mr. Zaccardelli, MP Dan McTeague, who was parliamentary secretary for consular cases when Paul Martin was prime minister, and RCMP counterterrorism officers Sgt. Walsh and Michel Cabana.

The commission's lawyers wrote back to say the lists were not necessarily complete, and that Mr. Cabana would be interviewed - but made no mention of the others.

Mr. Zaccardelli resigned his post as RCMP commissioner in December under fire for conflicting testimony about the force's actions in Mr. Arar's case.

"It's the chain-of-command issues. Zaccardelli was the head of the RCMP. If he wasn't aware of what was going on, why wasn't he? And if he was aware, what did he do about it?" said Ms. Jackman, who represents both Mr. Nureddin and Mr. El Maati.

"We don't even know who all the people are that they're interviewing. We know some of them. And in terms of whether or not they're getting at all the issues, it's blind faith."

Ms. Jackman said they are concerned that the government imposed a restrictive mandate on the inquiry because it fears the three cases would demonstrate a pattern of Canadian complicity in having third countries that use torture interrogate suspects to advance investigations.

"I have no confidence, to be honest with you. Because I don't know what's going on," Mr. Nureddin, 40, a geologist who was imprisoned in Syria for a month in 2003, said in a recent interview.

Mr. Laskin noted that the government called for a private inquiry when it set the terms of reference, and selected sections

can be held in public only when Mr. Iacobucci deems it essential.

Mr. Iacobucci issued rules of procedure for the inquiry in a May 31 decision, indicating that in general, lawyers for the three men would not be present at interviews and hearings. Instead, they can suggest "questions and lines of inquiry" to the commission counsel, he ruled.

That ruling is now being challenged by the three men and several groups, including the Canadian Arab Federation and the B.C. Civil Liberties Association, which argue Mr. Iacobucci was too restrictive in interpreting his mandate and is not making the inquiry public enough to instill confidence.

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## Arar case sheds light on 3 others; [ONT Edition]

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### Abstract (Summary)

Thanks to a federal court judge who overrode most of Ottawa's bogus security claims, we now know what most long suspected that Ottawa was well aware of the fate awaiting [Arar] after he was arrested in New York in September 2002. The newly uncensored portions show that the government knew the Americans were deporting Arar to the Middle East to be tortured for information, or as one security bureaucrat cunningly put it, to "have their way with him."

Yet all are part and parcel of the Arar case. O'Connor's original 2006 report concluded that Arar had been caught up because he knew [Abdullah Almalki] and El Maati. He also revealed that the RCMP suspected, without much substantive evidence, that Almalki was a terror kingpin. In order to find out more, the Mounties supplied Syrian torturers with questions for him.

The original version of the O'Connor report noted that in 2002 the Mounties wanted the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation to launch a criminal investigation into Almalki. What the government didn't want Canadians to know, and what was revealed only last week, is that the FBI refused. Clearly, the Americans didn't believe he was a much of a terrorist.

### Full Text (577 words)

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The release of previously censored portions of the Maher Arar report adds a few new details to the now familiar story of his despicable treatment by the federal government and its security agencies.

Thanks to a federal court judge who overrode most of Ottawa's bogus security claims, we now know what most long suspected that Ottawa was well aware of the fate awaiting Arar after he was arrested in New York in September 2002. The newly uncensored portions show that the government knew the Americans were deporting Arar to the Middle East to be tortured for information, or as one security bureaucrat cunningly put it, to "have their way with him."

Yet for the entire time that Arar was in jail in Damascus, the Canadian government publicly denied he was in danger of torture. We now know Ottawa was lying.

However, the most important revelations from last week's release relate not to Arar but to three other Canadians whose cases are before a judicial inquiry.

Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad El Maati and Muayyed Nureddin are trying to find out what role Ottawa played in their imprisonment and torture in Syria and Egypt between 2001 and 2004.

All are Canadian citizens. All had previously travelled to Syria without incident. All were arrested by the Syrians on subsequent journeys, imprisoned and tortured. El Maati was sent on to Egypt for more torture.

All say they were asked questions by their torturers which could have come only from Canada.

The trio had brief walk-on parts during Justice Dennis O'Connor's investigation of the Arar matter. He recommended that Ottawa establish an "independent and credible" inquiry into their cases.

In December, Prime Minister Stephen Harper asked former Supreme Court justice Frank Iacobucci to do that. But Harper set such rigid constraints (the inquiry is being held almost entirely in secret, with even the complainants denied access to most evidence) that the probe's credibility, if not its independence, is in question.

Yet all are part and parcel of the Arar case. O'Connor's original 2006 report concluded that Arar had been caught up because he knew Almalki and El Maati. He also revealed that the RCMP suspected, without much substantive evidence, that Almalki was a terror kingpin. In order to find out more, the Mounties supplied Syrian torturers with questions for him.

The unexpurgated version, however, shows that the relationship between the Mounties and Syrian intelligence went far deeper. In September 2002, the RCMP used El Maati's so-called confession, obtained under Syrian torture, as the basis for obtaining wiretaps in Canada. Earlier that year, they used similar information obtained from what the report calls "a country with a poor human rights record" to get search warrants. It seems the RCMP found the torturers useful.

The original version of the O'Connor report noted that in 2002 the Mounties wanted the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation